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Abstract
Recent years have seen increasing opposition 
to U.S. political and economic influence in 
Latin America. Venezuela is a key player in 
the South American economy. This project 
researches the country’s history from the 
1950s to the present and the role of the 
U.S. in its formation. Through political 
economy, this study asks if recent political 
changes are due to the effects of U.S. policies 
in Venezuela. The research examines 
the relationship between the two nations 
and the development models proposed 
by the Chávez government. The paper 
considers alternative models of economic 
development, independent from U.S. 
political hegemony.
Introduction
On April 11, 2002, a group of 
senior military officers stormed the 
presidential palace in Caracas, the 
capital of Venezuela. They ousted the 
leftist president, Hugo Chávez, and 
replaced him with the more conservative 
Pedro Carmona. The coup had the 
support of the business community, 
the upper classes, the mass media, and 
tacit support from the U.S.; however, 
the de-facto government was short 
lived (Cooper, 2002; Hellinger, 2003; 
García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti, 2005). 
Thousands of the nation’s poor filled 
the streets demanding that Chávez be 
restored to office while, in a surprising 
move, branches of the Venezuelan 
military acted to support rather than 
suppress the movement. After two 
days of massive protests, Carmona 
stepped down and Chávez returned 
to power. Scholars Steve Ellner and 
Daniel Hellinger (2003) claim that 
this scenario “has no equivalent in 
Latin American history” (p. ix). No 
equivalent in Latin American history? 
Such a strong assertion, as well as the 
media controversy over Chávez and 
his “Bolivarian Revolution,” are what 
spur research on this topic. What has 
happened in Venezuela to create such 
controversy, and what does it mean?
The goals of this project are two-fold. 
The first is to investigate recent changes 
in Venezuelan society since the election 
of Hugo Chávez, putting them in a 
historical context that reveals their root 
causes. This enables one to see beyond 
the rhetoric and romanticism of street 
protests and coups, making sense of 
social and economic changes that may 
appear at a glance to be chaotic. The 
second goal is to develop a theoretical 
interpretation of these national changes 
that is grounded in a global framework. 
Globalization has been changing the 
way people understand the concepts 
of community and economy; therefore 
focusing on the national level alone is 
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insufficient. Careful attention has been 
paid here to the colonial history of 
Latin American countries – this history 
continues to shape development and 
politics of power in the region, and it is 
my belief that present-day inequalities 
stem from its legacy. Upon looking at 
the case of Venezuela, I argue that the 
revolutionary program proposed by 
Chávez is not so shocking given the 
history and structure of Venezuela’s 
political-economic system. I also submit 
that, despite its shortcomings, the 
program offers policy changes that are 
necessary for the development of regional 
sovereignty for South America and for 
a sustainable system that is inclusive of 
previously marginalized Venezuelans. The 
“revolution” that Chávez brought with 
his presidency may well be a middle-
road model that defies both traditional 
capitalist and state-socialist models. 
History
Traditional democracy: The Punto Fijo system
For decades, Venezuela was considered 
by many to be an “exceptional” nation, 
both because of its prosperous economy 
and because of its governmental system 
similar to that of the United States 
(Coronil, 2000; Ellner, 2003; Kelly & 
Romero, 2002). The political structure 
was founded in 1958 with the Pact of 
Punto Fijo, an agreement that established 
an electoral democratic system after 
years of dictatorship and coups. The 
new arrangement was designed to bring 
together democracy, oil nationalism, 
and economic development in a project 
that cast the state as distributor of oil 
rent money (Coronil, 2000; Hellinger, 
2003). In the electoral system, two 
dominant parties shared power – the 
social democratic Acción Democratica 
(AD) and Christian democratic Comité 
de Organización Política Electoral 
Independiente (COPEI). The two parties 
alternated in power uninterrupted for 
nearly four decades.
According to historian-anthropologist 
Fernando Coronil (1997), Venezuelan 
democracy was distinctive because 
of its fusion of resource wealth with 
political power. With this combination, 
he says, citizens could expect to both 
participate in the political system and 
benefit from the natural wealth of the 
country’s resources. Furthermore, he 
describes how the nation could be 
thought of as having two parts: a “social 
body” made of its people and political 
organization, and a “natural body” made 
of its physical resources. This split was 
significant because it aligned political 
power with nature, rather than with 
the people: “the nation’s social body 
became more marked as the passive 
beneficiary of its natural body, seen 
now as the main source of the nation’s 
powers” (Coronil, 1997, p. 168). It is 
in this context that one can understand 
Venezuela’s economic system of statism. 
Such systems, internally-focused and 
less open to foreign investment, were 
common from the 1930s to 1960s in 
Latin America and the United States. 
Statist philosophy maintains that the 
state should create the conditions for 
industrial development and strategic 
strength (Kelly & Romero, 2002). This 
was the goal of the Pact of Punto Fijo, 
which organized the state to be the 
manager of its natural resource wealth. 
The close relationship between the 
state and industry in this model meant 
that the government derived most of 
its revenue from the oil industry. Oil 
drilling had begun in 1914, expanded 
quickly throughout the 1950s, and 
when Venezuela nationalized its oil 
industry in 1976, it represented the 
culmination of the Punto Fijo project 
(Hellinger, 2003). After the oil embargo 
by the Arab states of OPEC, global 
oil prices skyrocketed, making for 
windfall revenues to oil-exporting 
nations world-wide. (See Figure 1.) 
Indeed, Venezuela received more money 
during this boom than all of Europe 
did under the Marshall Plan (Coronil, 
1997). The surge in income allowed 
the Venezuelan government to further 
its statist agenda. It increased spending 
on social programs and infrastructure 
projects, and from the oil industry grew 
a prosperous middle class.
A sharp decline in oil prices after the 
1970s began to erode the middle class 
and forced the government to borrow 
heavily to maintain its social spending. 
This caused Venezuela (and numerous 
other Latin American export-based 
economies) to accumulate massive debts, 
the effects of which are still felt today.
Figure 1. International crude oil prices from 1978 to 2005 (Source: Oil Energy)
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It is critical to understand how the 
bond between governmental institutions 
and oil money shapes the economic 
and social progress of the country. 
Statism and Import Substitution 
Industrialization were common in other 
Latin American countries as well, but 
the high revenues brought in by oil (as 
opposed to other primary-good exports) 
were what had helped to bolster 
Venezuela’s exceptional image.
The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist 
model: Long-term causes
The exceptionality was not an inherent 
national characteristic, however, and in 
the last decade Venezuelans watched 
as their system of 40 years came apart 
at the seams. There are both long-term 
and immediate reasons for the decline, 
both of which must be acknowledged 
to understand the current situation. 
The long-term economic and political 
factors leading to the demise of 
puntofijismo have to do with the efficacy 
and legitimacy of the system. Scholars 
disagree over which factors were most 
important, though there is a general 
consensus that the system was in decay. 
Some believe that the main cause was 
a matter of economic mismanagement. 
Terry Karl (as cited in Hellinger, 
2001; as cited in Ellner, 2003) blames 
Venezuela’s economic failure on the 
reliance on oil to sustain the economy. 
She argues that oil-exporting nations 
suffer a phenomenon known as the 
“Dutch Disease,” a problem that occurs 
when booms overvalue currency and 
weaken other sectors in a domestic 
market. A single-export based economy 
is also vulnerable to fluctuations in 
market prices, which can be disastrous 
when they fall.
As Kelly and Romero (2002) point 
out, high prices can also be disastrous. 
High revenues can lead to over-
confidence (“an atmosphere of easy 
money”) and corruption (Kelly & 
Romero, p. 149). The boom’s impact 
in Venezuela was to create a society 
in which the population expected 
the state to distribute the wealth 
of its export, despite the lack of 
productivity and organization on the 
part of the population (Parenti, 2005; 
Kelly & Romero). Ever since 1936, 
the government has touted its goal of 
“sowing the oil,” the phrase for using 
the nation’s oil wealth to establish 
productive enterprises in other sectors.
The country’s failure to “sow the 
oil” does not surprise Coronil (1997), 
however, who argues that Dutch Disease 
is a misnomer. He says that it should 
be renamed the “Third World” or “Neo-
colonial Disease,” pointing out that 
it is “an epidemic in the monocrop 
economies of the third world” that 
seldom afflicts nations of first-world 
status (Coronil, 1997, p. 7). He also 
argues that the Dutch Disease does 
not give a satisfactory explanation of 
the decline of the economy because 
the real causes are beyond mere 
mismanagement. The economic and 
social downturn that took place after 
the boom of the 70s had to do with 
over-reliance on oil, but the overall 
decline was the result of structural and 
cultural deficiencies in the country. The 
Punto Fijo government was not really 
a democratic revolution that eliminated 
the oligarchs of the past, as the national 
mythology led people to believe. Rather, 
Coronil (1997, 2000) claims, it was a 
compromise on the part of the elite to 
transfer political power to the electorate 
while maintaining the privileges of 
wealth and influence. 
Just as oil wealth had allowed the 
concentration of political power in 
the figure of the president during 
[previous military dictatorships], 
it made it possible for the ruling 
democratic parties to monopolize 
political and economic power and 
to exert extraordinary influence 
over society. (Coronil, 2000, p. 35)
If the Punto Fijo system is analyzed 
in this light, the failure of Venezuela to 
create a sustainable economy did not 
result only from mismanagement by 
party leaders, but also from the structure 
of the political-economic system itself. It 
is well-documented that the system was 
marred by corruption, and the struggle 
to be rid of it continues (Maya, 2003; 
Roberts, 2003; Gott 2001; Coronil, 
1997; Munckton, 2005; Parenti, 2005). 
Corruption was visible when Carlos 
Andres Pérez, president for the first 
time during the late-seventies oil boom, 
suffered two separate coup attempts 
during his second term in 1992. The 
coups failed, but Pérez was impeached 
on counts of corruption the following 
year. In the 1993 presidential elections, 
the abstention rate was 39%, the 
highest in Venezuelan history (Buxton, 
2003). These events, and others to 
follow, served to reinforce a widespread 
discontent with the party system, which 
had caused them in the first place 
(Coronil, 2000).
Partly as a result of the corruption, 
the benefits of oil money were not 
enjoyed equally by all Venezuelans. 
Political power in the democracy was 
strictly centralized in the two parties 
and was distributed on the basis of 
patron-client relationships. Unlike the 
ideology that cast each citizen as part 
land-owner (Coronil, 2000), not all of 
the population shared in the prosperity 
of oil sales. The biggest beneficiaries of 
national wealth were those who were 
best positioned to take advantage of 
political institutions in the patronage 
system – these tend to be urban 
dwellers of upper-class status and 
White/European ethnic origins. Political 
access has been especially difficult for 
Indigenous and Black Venezuelans, 
minorities who were not protected by 
the constitution prior to 1999 (Becker, 
2004). Even in 2000, the top 10 percent 
of the population received half of the 
national income (Gott, 2001).
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Acknowledging the sources of 
the economic decline, it must be 
emphasized that the erosion of living 
standards began far in advance of the 
tumultuous events of the 1990s. After 
international oil prices plummeted in 
the 1980s, Venezuela had borrowed 
heavily to maintain its funding for 
social programs and services. Loans did 
not secure social spending, however. 
During the neoliberal economic 
adjustments of the late 1980s, countries 
aimed to decentralize the government 
and economy through financial 
deregulation and privatization of state 
enterprises. However, these measures 
only exacerbated poor conditions. In 
Venezuela, social spending decreased 
from 8 percent of GDP to 4.3 percent 
(Roberts, 2003), and with the decreased 
national income came impoverishment 
and a widening income gap. Julia 
Buxton (2003) reports that poverty grew 
from 36% to 66% from the mid 80s to 
mid 90s, shooting from 43.9% to 66.5% 
in the year between 1988 and 1989. At 
the height of political crisis in the mid 
1990s, the general poverty rate was at 
86% (Buxton). The middle class had 
shrunk and civil society increasingly 
lacked organization. This was especially 
true of organized labor; as the economy 
grew less formal, the traditional, more 
productive enterprises of industry and 
agriculture waned while service jobs, 
short-term and informal employment 
had become prominent. These trends 
show that the economic decline came in 
a number of ways and occurred over an 
extended period of time.
The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist 
model: Immediate causes
Immediate factors signaled the fall of the 
traditional system as well. The coups 
of 1992 and impeachment of Carlos 
Andres Pérez were not the only visible 
evidence of the decline; other events 
illustrated the increasing social unrest 
and disillusionment. In 1989, Pérez 
had been elected for another term by 
Venezuelans who opposed free-market 
or neoliberal reforms (Buxton, 2003; 
Márquez, 2003). Contrary to his social 
democratic platform, Pérez shocked 
the nation by embracing the policies he 
had decried in the 1970s. In what has 
been dubbed “The Great U-Turn,” he 
announced on February 16 that he had 
already made an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
implement liberalization measures.
Shortly after his announcement the 
Bolivar was deregulated and the price 
of petroleum shot up by 100%. This 
placed an immediate burden on bus 
drivers living in the crowded shanty 
towns around Caracas. To cover costs, 
they doubled bus fares, and on February 
27, commuters rioted in response, 
sending a wave of protests through the 
countryside in a matter of days. It took 
five days to quell the revolt, known as 
the Caracazo, and this single event has 
had a lasting impact on Venezuelan 
society. Pérez later explained that his 
decision was due to the desperate need 
for foreign investment. Acknowledging 
that the decision was unpopular, he said 
that Venezuelans “…must understand 
that these are unavoidable. There was 
no other way out” (Gott, 2001, p. 51). 
The riots were the country’s first mass 
expression of class-based unrest since 
the 1930s and marked the end of 
passivity on the part of the public.
Like the Caracazo, the failed coups 
of 1992 were also turning points. The 
first attempt was led by Hugo Chávez 
Frías, a young officer who had been 
involved in revolutionary organizing 
within the military academy. When he 
and the coup supporters were arrested 
for treason, he made a one-minute 
televised statement in which he told his 
comrades to put down their arms and 
took responsibility for the failure. He 
declared to the public that por ahora 
(for the time being), their objectives had 
not been reached. This phrase signaled 
a continuing commitment to the anti-
party cause, and his apology left an 
impression in the minds of the public, 
who were not accustomed to hearing 
political figures accept blame for their 
failures (Parenti, 2005; Gott, 2001).
While the military coup tactics failed, 
Chávez returned after his release from 
prison to organize a coalition that 
could oust the dominant parties in a 
presidential electoral bid. As the Punto 
Fijo regime faded, various smaller 
parties came on board to form the Polo 
Patriótico (Patriotic Pole), a coalition 
for what had become the Movimiento 
Quinta República or Movement for the 
Fifth Republic (MVR). In 1998, Chávez 
ran on the platform of writing a new 
constitution and leading the nations of 
South America in an original direction 
that would unite and strengthen the 
region (Gott, 2001). After the MVR 
did well in local elections, COPEI and 
AD desperately moved to endorse the 
independent Salas Römer one week 
before the election. It was not enough 
to sway the election, and Chávez 
won the presidency by a 56 to 39.9 
percent margin (Hellinger, 2003). The 
new constitution was drafted by a 
constituent assembly and approved by a 
referendum vote in 1999.
Politics and policy in the era of Chavismo
Using legitimate means to take power 
has not guaranteed an easy time for 
Chávez and his administration. The 
opposition has been fierce since his first 
election, marching en masse afterward to 
demand both his ouster and a recall vote 
on the basis that the election had been 
rigged. Supporters have also turned out 
to fill the streets, marching in defense of 
Chávez’s legitimacy and celebrating the 
anniversary of his inauguration. Both 
opponents and supporters continue to 
protest, voicing opinions about chavista 
policies and programs. The stark split 
between those who revere the president 
and those who despise him makes for a 
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polarized and volatile political climate 
(Ellner & Hellinger, 2003; García-
Guadilla, 2003; Roberts, 2003).
Increased polarization can be seen 
in political parties, labor groups and 
civil organizations, but class divisions 
are what most clearly distinguish 
pro- from anti-governmental factions. 
Chávez’s support comes predominantly 
from the peasant and working classes. 
According to a Datanalysis poll, in the 
1998 presidential campaign Chávez 
received the strongest support from 
youth, men and lower classes (as cited 
in Hellinger, 2003). In a subsequent 
race against Francisco Arias Cárdenas, 
the class distinction was again very clear, 
with Arias receiving support from 2/3 
of the wealthy and middle-class sectors, 
Chávez from a majority of the poorest 
social sectors (Hellinger, 2003). And as 
noted, the reversal of the 2002 coup 
was due in large part to the immediate 
response of crowds from the poor 
barrios (Hellinger, 2003). 
As Chávez continues to pay particular 
attention to the poor and to the 
Indigenous and Black communities, his 
approval ratings have grown immensely. 
The 1999 constitution brought changes 
by offering protection of land and 
resources for Indigenous communities, 
official status for Indigenous languages, 
and the reservation of three deputy seats 
in the National Assembly for Indigenous 
representatives (Becker, 2004). In two 
polls, Chávez’s support has grown to a 
range of 53% to 70% and support for 
the opposition has shrunk to a range of 
10% to 27% (“And now your,” 2005).
Conversely, it is in the ranks of the 
middle and upper classes that the most 
opposition is found. The opposition 
rallies and marches during the brief 
2002 coup were organized in the more 
affluent areas of eastern Caracas. The 
coup itself showed where opposition 
lay: it was supported by a faction of 
military officers, business elites and the 
privately-owned mass media (Cooper, 
2002; Hellinger, 2003). Pedro Carmona, 
the man chosen as interim president 
during the coup, had been the head 
of Fedecámaras, the nation’s leading 
business association. Even during the 
anti-government oil strike/lockout of 
2001, the majority of worker organizing 
was done by unionized labor, which 
is imbedded in the clientelist political 
system; workers in the informal sectors 
continued working (Hellinger, 2003). 
A New York Times editorial affirms the 
source of opposition, saying that Chávez’ 
opponents do not speak for the majority 
of the population. Referencing his 
victory in the 2004 recall referendum, 
the editorial attributes Chávez’ victory 
to the fact that his programs address 
the concerns of the poor, who have 
“felt like the neglected stepchildren of 
the country’s oil boom” (“Hugo Chávez 
wins,” 2004). The referendum had been 
called for by opponents on the basis 
of fraud, but after auditing the results 
Chávez’s win was endorsed by both the 
Organization of American States and the 
U.S.-based Carter Center (Forero, 2004).
Domestic agenda in the new order: 
The Missiónes
Despite the fierce opposition, the 
administration has won seven national 
referendums, succeeding in passing 
a new constitution and initiating a 
number of social programs. With the 
stated goal of forming its own model 
of “21st century socialism” or a “social, 
humanist, egalitarian economy” (“Oil, 
Missions,” 2005), the government’s 
purpose with the projects is to give 
more Venezuelans access to land, 
education, health care and a means 
of livelihood (Parenti, 2005; “Oil, 
Missions,” 2005). 
One of the first major projects was 
“Plan Bolívar 2000,” a civil-military 
public works project in which military 
personnel worked to improve sanitation, 
health, transportation, housing, and 
other public infrastructures. It was both 
a practical attempt to provide jobs and 
services and a political attempt to show 
the MVR party as a joint civil-military 
organization (Buxton, 2003; Hellinger, 
2003; Roberts, 2003). A series of other 
projects, or missions as they are called, 
have been initiated more recently, 
addressing the foundations for social 
welfare and a sustainable economy.
Two of the most successful missions 
have been for health care and education. 
Misión Barrio Adentro (Inner-City 
Mission, roughly) has been providing 
health care with the help of over 20,000 
Cuban medics; it is reported to have 
done over 185 million consultations 
and saved over 25,000 lives (Munckton, 
2005). The program has been criticized 
by Venezuelans who fear the influence 
of Cuban communism; others regard it 
as nothing more than social work (“Oil, 
missions,” 2005). Social work in the 
realm of education is being provided 
by Misión Ribas (Mission Robinson), a 
program that offers free adult education. 
It serves Venezuelans who haven’t 
been able to attend high school due to 
economic hardship; it offers stipends 
to poor students and flexible hours for 
those who are working. The program 
graduated over 20,000 people in June, 
and 210,000 people are expected to have 
been graduated by the end of this year. 
Most have already enrolled in Misión 
Sucre, which provides people with free 
university education (Munckton).
Other missions address issues of 
food, land reform and housing. Food 
sovereignty is the goal of Misión Mercal, 
a project of state-run supermarkets. 
Twenty five thousand Mercal stores 
hold 60% of the food market and 
source food from government-owned 
cooperatives. This is a strategic move 
toward food sovereignty for a country 
that imports the vast majority of its 
food (Munckton, 2005).
Likewise, land reform is a crucial 
component of food sovereignty. 
Government projects have been started 
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to address rural land access issues, 
which is urgent in a land where the 
population is concentrated in urban 
centers. The situation is precarious; 
according to The Economist, 75% of 
farmland is owned by less than 5% of 
landowners (“And now your,” 2005). 
The government claims that the country 
cannot grow enough food to feed its 
citizens, and its newly-created National 
Lands Institute has begun a review of 
latifundio, or large estates, for possible 
redistribution (Bruce, Apr 29, 2005). 
The government has asked hundreds 
of firms to provide proof of title back 
to 1848; failure to do so may result 
in distribution of plots of land to 
campesinos for small-scale agriculture 
and farming cooperatives. At the time 
of this publication only two estates have 
had land expropriated, one of which 
is a cattle ranch owned by the British 
Vestey Group. Parts of the ranch have 
been occupied by peasants for several 
years. In March of this year, however, 
the government declared failure of the 
firm to provide adequate proof of title. 
This clears the way for the government 
to provide permanent titles to dozens of 
families already living on the land under 
provisional titles. The move is opposed 
by ranchers, who have 60 days to legally 
contest the government’s decision. 
According to Bruce (Apr 29, 2005), 
officials in charge of the reform say that 
the goal is “effective but peaceful land 
reform” (para. 23), which involves only 
partial expropriation; the government 
says that it would like for the ranchers 
to continue using part of the land for 
cattle ranching.
The Chávez administration is also 
trying to address urban land issues. 
The Housing Mission is giving titles to 
poor Venezuelans who have been living 
on plots for years, often in homes they 
built themselves (“Venezuela to offer,” 
2005; Munckton, 2005). Additionally, 
the government is building low-cost 
housing and providing subsidies and 
credits to help pay for the homes. 
Chávez has promised to build half a 
million homes by next year, with hopes 
of completely solving the housing crisis 
in 17 years. He has admitted, however, 
that so far they have fallen short of the 
mark, saying that housing “is one of the 
most serious [problems] that Venezuela 
faces. Our revolution has provided some 
answers but they’re really not enough” 
(“Venezuela to offer,” 2005). In the last 
five years, only 91,000 homes have 
been built, not enough to house the 26 
million who have inadequate housing.
As part of the broader Project 
PAIS (Poblaciones Agro-Industrialies 
Sustentables, or Sustainable Agro-
Industrial Populations), Chávez is 
combining the missions with job 
training and the formation of worker 
cooperatives. The goal is to encourage 
re-settlement of the countryside by 
creating centers of development that 
contain clinics, schools, and workshops 
for the production of goods (“Oil, 
missions,” 2005; Gott, 2001; Munckton, 
2005; Parenti, 2005). The projects are 
reported to have benefited 70% of the 
population thus far (“Venezuela politics,” 
2005; Munckton, 2005). However, all 
of Chávez’s projects have been made 
possible by unusually high international 
oil prices, over $65US per barrel at the 
time of this paper. (See Figure 2.) Time 
will tell if the projects have succeeded in 
“sowing” the oil money, or if they have 
merely spent it. The future of Chávez’s 
agenda remains uncertain.
Chávez’s programs may also appear 
inadequate because poverty rates have 
not decreased since reforms began. 
The statistic from the Miami Herald 
(as cited in Weisbrot, 2005) is often 
quoted by opponents that the poverty 
rate grew from 49% in 1998 to 53% 
in 2004. The figures are correct, but 
they do not necessarily depict what 
is taking place in society as a whole. 
Others counter that the poverty rate 
had begun to decline in 2003, and 
living standards for the lowest 84% 
of the population have increased by 
one third after accounting for inflation 
(Datos Information Resources, as cited 
in Munckton, 2005). According to 
Weisbrot (2005), statistics on household 
poverty do not include non-cash 
income of the poor such as subsidized 
food, health care and housing. 
Furthermore, he says that these 
kinds of subsidies have dramatically 
improved quality of life for the majority 
of Venezuelans. Because of this, he 
argues, one must take into account the 
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Figure 2. Global crude oil prices over 2-year span (Source: U.S. Department of Energy)
Note: WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Brent are particular types of crude oil 
that are used as references for quality (Elf, 2005).
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different kinds of changes in resource 
distribution that are happening in 
Venezuela in order to compare the 
effectiveness of Chávez’s policies.
International agenda
The missións are attempting to improve 
quality of life for Venezuelans on the 
domestic front. As a direct result of 
the missións, millions of Venezuelans 
are receiving food and land, forming 
worker cooperatives for production of 
goods for the domestic market, and 
have more access to a high school and 
college-level education. But international 
relations also play an important role in 
Chávez’s Bolivarian vision. When he ran 
for president, Chávez promised changes 
that would protect the country from the 
negative effects of globalization (Kelly 
& Romero, 2002). A key part of his 
plan to revive the nation is encouraging 
cooperation among countries in South 
America and the Caribbean, outside 
of the influence of the United States. 
Venezuela’s increasing involvement 
in the Andean Community, OPEC, 
and neighboring countries shows his 
commitment to regional integration 
and international trade, though moves 
such as oil contracts with Cuba have 
not been well-received by the U.S. Even 
yet, Venezuela has remained a reliable 
supplier of oil to the United States and is 
still a major importer of U.S. goods.
Economic integration is just one part of 
the plan to strengthen the region; cultural 
and political coordination form the other. 
This summer the government (along 
with Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba) 
launched a new Latin American television 
network, Telesur, which is meant to 
provide a venue for media from a Latin 
American perspective. Andres Izarra, 
Telesur’s president, describes the project 
as “an initiative to integrate through 
communication the different countries of 
the region [and] an essential pre-requisite 
for closer political and economic links 
across Latin America” (Bruce, Jun 28, 
2005, para. 16). Chávez has also used 
the Organization of American States 
and the United Nations as sounding 
boards for building regional unity and for 
defense of political actions. In an hopeful 
statement in a March meeting between 
Chávez and heads of state from Brazil, 
Colombia, and Spain, Chávez said that “a 
new geopolitical map is forming on the 
horizon,” one “without confrontations” 
(“Presidente Chávez,” 2005, para. 8).
Discussion
Class relations within Venezuelan society
It seems quite possible that a new 
geopolitical map is on the horizon for 
Latin America, though it is not likely to 
be free of confrontations. As illustrated, 
a fierce debate rages between supporters 
and opponents of Chávez. Both sides 
have claims that are legitimate; thus in 
order to understand the situation it is 
not enough to take a side, one must 
understand what is at stake for those 
on different sides of the debate. Also, 
the struggle is taking place in both the 
national and international arenas.
As discussed above, most of Chávez’s 
opponents are of privileged social status 
and class. As a result, their privilege is 
at risk with the success of the MVR’s 
policies. The Punto Fijo government, 
while far more democratic than the 
dictators and military regimes that 
preceded it, was a system that remained 
by and for the wealthy. The reason that 
Chávez was able to gain power and 
that his revolutionary programs have 
been relatively well-received is that the 
majority of the population was and 
is seeking radical change (Hellinger, 
2003). Coronil’s observation (1997, 
2000) that the system appeared, but 
was not fully inclusive is important. 
Political power has consistently been 
reserved for the upper class status and 
people of European descent – never 
for Indigenous or mixed ethnicity, until 
Chávez (Becker, 2004). What Chávez 
did with his electoral bid was bring 
class issues to the forefront of political 
dialogue in Venezuela. Because the 
traditional balance of power has been 
unequal, the creation of a more inclusive 
system will necessarily require the 
political elite to sacrifice some privilege. 
Land reform, proportional representation 
and government-subsidized social 
services are just a few examples of how a 
better balance of power may be created. 
If productive enterprises such as worker 
cooperatives can be sustained, they 
may also be the key to the country’s 
sustainable non-oil economy.
Most Venezuelans were prosperous 
during the oil boom of the 20th 
century. The problem was that it was 
not a sustainable prosperity nor was 
it, as many had believed, the reward 
for their exceptional self-governance. 
With citizens content to rely on the 
government for distribution of resources, 
they were not required to be active 
beyond participating in elections. This 
poses a problem today as the country 
tries to wean itself off of its reliance 
on oil and spur productivity in other 
areas. As the planning and development 
minister, Jorge Giordani, told The Nation:
We’ve been fighting political battles 
for most of our time in office. Many 
people have learned to read in the 
last few years, but how long will 
it take for them to work in high 
technology, or medicine, or services? 
Three years? A generation? We are 
fighting a very individualistic, rentier 
culture. Everything has been ‘Mama 
state, Papa state, give me oil money.’ 
To organize people is extremely 
hard. (as cited in Parenti, 2005, p. 5)
This problem is not easily placed on 
any one individual or institution, but 
on a confluence of factors in Venezuela’s 
history. The root causes of economic 
decline were many, and as a result 
solutions will necessarily take time. 
Chávez seems to be trying to address 
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this by requiring that communities 
organize in order to receive aid from 
the government. One attempt at this 
organization is the proliferation of 
“Bolivarian circles,” which are small, 
civilian-led local groups formed to 
broaden participation in and support 
for the Bolivarian cause (Maya, 2003; 
García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti). In 
order for there to be true and long-
lasting transformation, however, local 
community organizing must continue 
by Venezuelans of all political bents. 
Education as well will play a key role, if 
the educational missiónes are carried out 
in a way that cultivates active and non-
partisan citizenship.
Changes in global dynamics of power
Because no nation exists in complete 
isolation in today’s world, power 
relationships must be transformed on 
the global level as well. The relationship 
between nations of first- and third-
world status has historically been one 
of inequality, and for all its wealth as 
an oil-exporting nation, Venezuela 
has not managed to escape this. 
Extraction of resources by colonial 
powers was followed by extraction 
of resources by first-world consumer 
markets, and finally loans that required 
radical structural adjustments ravaged 
the fragile society. For economic 
development to benefit everyone in 
South American nations, serious strides 
must be made to give the poor access 
to institutions of power and democratic 
decision-making. How Venezuela is 
represented in international forums, 
institutions, and in mass media will 
do much to determine the role the 
country will have in determining its 
development agenda.
Though it is often portrayed as such, 
chavismo cannot be easily dismissed 
as anti-globalization, anti-capitalist or 
even anti-American. Kelly and Romero 
(2002) cite regional integration in 
the form of the Andean Community 
and Mercosur as an “alternative to 
globalization” (p. 39). This is only 
accurate if globalization is defined 
narrowly, as what has been dubbed 
the “Washington Consensus” or the 
model of U.S.-led neoliberal capitalism. 
Globalization should not be limited 
to the design of first-world schools 
of thought, however. Chávez has said 
that his project is “neither statist nor 
neo-liberal,” that they are “exploring 
the middle ground, where the invisible 
hand of the market joins up with the 
visible hand of the state: as much state 
as necessary, and as much market as 
possible” (Gott, 2001, p. 172). It is 
clear both by the government’s efforts 
to strengthen ties with neighboring 
nations and its enthusiastic involvement 
with international trade that it is not 
opposed to globalization. It cannot be 
anti-capitalist either, as evidenced by 
the way that Chávez has maintained 
constitutional protection for capitalist 
elements such as private property rights 
and foreign collaboration with the state 
oil industry.
What seems more likely is that 
Chávez is seeking a model of 
involvement in the global economy 
that puts Venezuela first – a model that 
will raise the standard of living for the 
poor and empower the country and 
region, rather than continue the failed 
neoliberal model that was destructive 
in its implementation. It should come 
as no surprise that most Venezuelans 
have rejected the orthodox economic 
model championed by the United States, 
because it did not benefit them.
Once this distinction is made, 
it becomes easier to understand 
Chávez’s harsh treatment of the U.S. 
in his rhetoric. His inflammatory anti-
Americanism is often the focus of media 
attention, as with his denunciation 
of a U.S. memo to the nations of 
CARICOM in June. The memo asked 
CARICOM nations to encourage Chávez 
to respect democratic institutions, 
accusing his government of using oil 
money to “destabilize its democratic 
neighbors” while “financing extremist 
and antidemocratic groups” in the 
region (“EEUU envió informes,” 2005). 
Chávez was quick to rebuke the United 
States, defending his commitment to 
democracy. Citing the history of U.S. 
intervention in the region, he called 
the memorandum “a slap in the face” 
(“EEUU envió informes”).
Despite this tension, Chávez has 
not completely rejected nor attacked 
the historical ally of his country. He 
is critical of U.S. intervention, as he 
is seeking ways for nations in the 
region to resolve their own conflicts 
and determine their own style of 
involvement in global affairs. Given 
that there is a well-documented history 
of U.S. involvement in Latin American 
affairs, including the coup attempt on 
Chávez in 2002, his wariness is perhaps 
justified. Relations were not helped by 
the recent television broadcast of U.S. 
Reverend Pat Robertson, who called for 
the assassination of Chávez on the basis 
that he had “destroyed the Venezuelan 
economy” and will make the continent 
“a launching pad for communist 
infiltration and Muslim extremism” 
(Borger & Campbell, 2005, p. 1). But 
the condemnations of these statements 
already voiced by citizens of the United 
States will hopefully serve to ameliorate 
the situation. 
Certainly problems exist with 
Chávez’s authoritarian tendencies; 
for the sake of limiting the scope of 
this paper, I have not attempted to 
elaborate on his reported disrespect for 
the civil rights of his opponents and 
members of the private media. What 
I do assert is that we must be careful 
not to think that the scenario is simply 
one of democracy versus dictatorship, 
because this is misleading; it obscures 
the problem of poverty and political 
exclusion that was the impetus for the 
changes Chávez promises.
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The extent of the “Revolution”
The pressure that South American 
countries face to modernize by the same 
model as the United States and Western 
Europe has created a clash of cultures 
that has yet to be reconciled because 
as of yet no one side has prevailed. 
This seems to be the question posed 
by Venezuela’s “revolution.” Chávez’s 
policies for economics, international 
relations, and development have serious 
implications both for Venezuelans 
and for how the world conceives 
of development. They have similar 
implications for how the U.S. conceives 
of its role in the hemisphere as a 
leader and mediator. In the interest 
of sustainability and more egalitarian 
models, people who have been held 
in third-world status will need to have 
more leadership roles in development. 
Venezuela today is pioneering a model 
of economic development that breaks 
with the past orthodox models of 
statism and capitalism. Those who 
live in the “first-world” would do 
well to glean fresh insights from the 
experiments of communities to the 
South. Not only are they sure to impact 
the future of global economic relations, 
but their experiments may provide 
helpful models for even the most 
successful nations, as all countries will 
face rapid change and uncertainty in the 
globalizing world.
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